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Abstract
We propose the concept of pseudorandom states and study their constructions, properties,
and applications. Under the assumption that quantum-secure one-way functions exist, we present
concrete and efficient constructions of pseudorandom states. The non-cloning theorem plays
a central role in our study—it motivates the proper definition and characterizes one of the
important properties of pseudorandom quantum states. Namely, there is no efficient quantum
algorithm that can create more copies of the state from a given number of pseudorandom states.
As the main application, we prove that any family of pseudorandom states naturally gives rise to
a private-key quantum money scheme.
1 Introduction
Pseudorandomness is one of the foundational concepts in modern cryptography and theoretical
computer science. A distribution function, or a permutation is pseudorandom if it is computationally
indistinguishable from a corresponding truly random object [35, 41, 9]. Pseudorandom objects,
such as pseudorandom generators (PRGs), pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and pseudorandom
permutations (PRPs) are fundamental and ubiquitous cryptographic building blocks in the design of
stream ciphers, block ciphers and message authentication codes [19, 25, 18, 34, 21]. In complexity
theory, pseudorandomness is of vital importance to an area called derandomization [29, 22].
In quantum information, truly random bits can be generated easily with trusted or even untrusted
quantum devices. Is pseudorandomness, a seemingly weaker notion of randomness, still relevant
in the context of quantum information processing? The answer is yes. Pseudorandom objects are
usually much more computationally efficient. By simple counting argument, one needs exponentially
many bits even to specify a truly random function or permutation on n-bit strings. Hence, truly
random objects are not feasible in most of the cryptography applications. In this sense, we should
think of pseudorandomness not as a weaker but as a different variant of randomness with its own
characteristics and strength.
There are recent studies of pseudorandom objects from quantum information perspectives
motivated by their applications in post-quantum cryptography. One natural question is whether
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the classical constructions such as PRFs and PRPs remain secure in the quantum setting. This
is a challenging task as, for example, a quantum adversary may query the underlying function
or permutation in superposition. Fortunately, people have so far restored a lot of positive results.
Assuming a one-way function that is hard to invert for polynomial-time quantum algorithms, we
can attain quantum-secure PRGs as well as PRFs [21, 43]. Furthermore, assuming quantum-secure
PRFs, one can construct quantum secure PRPs using various shuffling constructions [45, 36].
A related area of development in quantum information concerns state t-designs and unitary
t-designs [4, 14, 20, 10, 13, 23, 37, 46]. These are quantum analogues of t-wise independent random
variables, which are another useful relaxation of randomness. The major difference between t-wise
independence and pseudorandomness is the following. In the case of t-wise independence, the observer
who receives the randomness is only given a fixed number of samples, but may be computationally
unbounded; hence quantum t-designs satisfy an “information theoretic” or “statistical” notion of
security. In contrast, in the case of pseudorandomness, the observer who receives the randomness is
assumed to be computationally efficient; this leads to a “computational” notion of security, based on
some complexity theoretic assumption (e.g., the existence of one-way functions).
In general, these two notions, t-wise independence and pseudorandomness, are incomparable. On
one hand, the setting of pseudorandomness imposes stronger restrictions on the observer, since it
assumes a bound on the observer’s computational effort (say, running in probabilistic polynomial
time). On the other hand, the setting of t-wise independence imposes stronger restrictions on the
observer, since it forces the observer to be non-adaptive and limits the number of input copies to
the fixed parameter t, which is usually a constant or a fixed polynomial. In addition, different
distance measures are often used, e.g., trace distance or diamond norm, versus computational
distinguishability.
In this work, we study pseudorandom quantum objects such as quantum states and unitary
operators.Quantum states (in analogy to strings) and unitary operations (in analogy to functions)
form continuous spaces, and a “random” state or unitary operation inevitably exhibits unique as well
as puzzling features. Formally, people consider the Haar measure to capture perfect randomness on
the spaces of quantum states and unitary operators. A natural basic question is:
How to define and construct computational pseudorandom approximations of Haar randomness,
and what are their applications?
Our contributions. We set forth to attack this question formally. To this end, we propose definitions
of pseudorandom quantum states (PRS’s) and pseudorandom unitary operators (PRUs), present
efficient constructions of PRS’s, and demonstrate their applications such as private-key quantum
money schemes and quantum thermalization. Our main contributions include:
1. We propose a suitable definition of quantum pseudorandom states.
What is a proper definition of PRS’s? It is obvious that we should employ the notion of
quantum computational indistinguishability in the definition of quantum pseudorandom states.
Roughly, we consider a collection of quantum states
{|φk〉} indexed by k ∈ K; and as in the
definition of pseudorandom distributions, we may require that no efficient quantum algorithm
can tell the difference between |φk〉 for a random k and a state drawn according to the Haar
measure. This is a reasonable definition that has been seriously considered in the literature
(e.g. [11, 12]). Although this definition may be applicable in certain situations, it does not seem
to grasp the quantum nature of the problem as purely classical distributions1 may also satisfy
1For example, a uniform distribution over the computational basis state {|k〉} has identical density matrix as the
Haar random states. Yet, there is however absolutely no quantum phenomena in this family of states and most of the
interesting applications discussed later in this paper become impossible.
2
the definition. Instead, we require that any adversary cannot tell the difference even given any
polynomially many copies of the state. This stronger definition, motivated by the non-cloning
theorem, will in turn give rise to an interesting non-cloning theorem for pseudorandom states.
One can argue that this definition is also a faithful generalization of pseudorandom distributions
to the quantum state setting—the access to many copies is not explicitly mentioned classically
as one can always make arbitrarily many copies of classical information. It is also consistent
with the definition of pseudorandom Unitary operators discussed later in this paper.
2. We present concrete efficient constructions of PRS’s with the minimal assumption that quantum-
secure one-way functions exist.
Our construction uses any quantum-secure PRF = {PRFk}k∈K and computes it into the phases
of a uniform superposition state. We call such family of PRS the random phase states. This
family of states can be efficiently generated using the quantum Fourier transform and a phase
kick-back trick. We prove that this family of state is pseudorandom by a hybrid argument.
By the quantum security of PRF, the family is computationally indistinguishable from a
similar state family defined by truly random functions. We then prove that, this state family
corresponding to truly random functions is statistically indistinguishable from Haar random
states. Finally, by the fact that PRF exists assuming quantum-secure one-way functions, we
can base our PRS construction on quantum-secure one-way functions.
3. We establish interesting properties of PRS’s and discuss several applications. These include
the cryptographic non-cloning theorems for PRS’s and the construction of private-key quantum
money schemes based on PRS’s.
We prove that a PRS remains pseudorandom, even if we additionally give the distinguisher
an oracle that reflects about the given state (i.e., Oφ := 1 − 2|φ〉〈φ|). This establishes the
equivalence between the standard and a strong definition of PRS’s. Technically, this is proved
using the fact that with polynomially many copies of the state, one can approximately simulate
the reflection oracle Oφ.
We obtain general cryptographic non-cloning theorems of PRS’s both with and without the
reflection oracle. The theorems roughly state that given any polynomially many copies of
pseudorandom states, no polynomial-time quantum algorithm can produce even one more copy
of the state. We call them cryptographic non-cloning theorems due to the background of PRS’s
in pseudorandomness. The proofs of these theorems use SWAP tests in the reduction from a
hypothetical cloning algorithm to an efficient distinguishing algorithm violating the definition
of PRS’s.
Using the strong pseudorandomness and the cryptographic non-cloning theorem with reflection
oracle, we are able to give simple proofs that the corresponding private-key quantum money
scheme is secure. We stress that provably secure quantum money schemes had been elusive
until Aaronson and Christiano finally proved the first secure scheme in the black-box setting
in 2012 [2]. They used a specific construction based on hidden subspace state, whereas our
construction is more generic and can be based on any PRS. The freedom to choose and tweak
the underlying pseudorandom functions or permutations in the PRS may motivate and facilitate
the construction of public-key quantum money schemes in future work. Our proof also takes
an arguably simpler route than that in [2].
In general, PRS’s may be used in place of high-order quantum t-designs, giving a performance
improvement in certain applications. For example, pseudorandom states can be used to
construct toy models of quantum thermalization, where one is interested in quantum states
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that can be prepared efficiently (via some dynamical process), yet have “generic” or “typical”
properties (as exemplified by Haar-random pure states, for instance) [32]. Using t-designs
with polynomially large t, one can construct states that are “generic” in a strong information-
theoretic sense [24]. Using PRS, one can construct states that satisfy a weaker property: they
are computationally indistinguishable from “generic” states, for a polynomial-time observer.
But the PRS states may be more physically plausible, because they can be prepared in a
shorter time (e.g., by a polylogarithmic-depth quantum circuit).
4. We propose a definition of quantum pseudorandom unitary operators (PRUs). We also present
candidate constructions of PRUs (without a proof of security), by extending our techniques for
constructing PRS’s.
Classical Quantum
Ideal Uniform Haar measure
t-wise independence t-wise independence quantum t-designs
(this work)
Pseudorandom PRGs PRS’s
PRFs, PRPs PRUs
Table 1: Summary of various notions that approximate perfect randomness
Discussion. We summarize the mentioned variants of randomness in Table 1. The focus of this
work is mostly about PRS’s and we briefly touch upon PRUs. We view our work as an initial step
in an exciting direction and expect more applications and new questions inspired by our notion of
pseudorandom states and unitary operators.
Here, we point out some open problems which are particularly important and interesting. First,
can we prove the security of our candidate PRU constructions? The techniques developed in quantum
unitary designs [20, 10] seem helpful. Second, it is a natural question to ask whether quantum-secure
one-way functions are necessary for the construction of PRS’s. Third, can we establish security
proofs for more candidate constructions of PRS’s? Different constructions may have their own
special properties that may be useful in different settings. Finally, it is interesting to explore whether
our quantum money construction may be adapted to a public-key money scheme under reasonable
cryptographic assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notions
For a finite set X , |X | denotes the number of elements in X . We use the notion YX to denote the
set of all functions f : X → Y. For finite set X , we use x← X to mean that x is drawn uniformly
at random from X . The permutation group over elements in X is denoted as SX . We use poly(κ) to
denote the collection of polynomially bounded functions of the security parameter κ, and use negl(κ)
to denote negligible functions in κ. A function (κ) is negligible if for all constant c > 0, (κ) < κ−c
for large enough κ.
In this paper, we use a quantum register to name a collection of qubits that we view as a single
unit. Register names are represented by capital letters in a sans serif font. We use S(H), D(H),
U(H) and L(H) to denote the set of pure quantum states, density operators, unitary operators and
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bounded linear operators on space H respectively. An ensemble of states {(pi, ρi)} represents a
system prepared in ρi with probability pi. If the distribution is uniform, we write the ensemble as
{ρi}. The adjoint of matrix M is denoted as M∗. For matrix M , |M | is defined to be
√
M∗M . The
operator norm ‖M‖ of matrix M is the largest eigenvalue of |M |. The trace norm ‖M‖1 of M is
the trace of |M |. For two operators M,N ∈ L(H), the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product is defined as
〈M,N〉 = tr(M∗N).
A quantum channel is a physically admissible transformation of quantum states. Mathematically,
a quantum channel
E : L(H)→ L(K)
is a completely positive, trace-preserving linear map.
The trace distance of two quantum states ρ0, ρ1 ∈ D(H) is
D(ρ0, ρ1)
def
=
1
2
‖ρ0 − ρ1‖1 . (1)
It is well known that for a state drawn uniformly at random from the set {ρ0, ρ1}, the optimal
distinguish probability is given by
1 + D(ρ0, ρ1)
2
.
Define number N = 2n and set X = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The quantum Fourier transform on n
qubits is defined as
F =
1√
N
∑
x,y∈X
ωxyN |x〉〈y|. (2)
It is a well-known fact in quantum computing that F can be implemented in time poly(n).
For Hilbert space H and integer m, we use ∨mH to denote the symmetric subspace of H⊗m,
the subspace of states that are invariant under permutations of the subsystems. Let N be the
dimension of H and let X be the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} such that H is the span of {|x〉}x∈X . For any
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Xm, define state
∣∣x; Sym〉 =
√∏
j∈X mj !
m!
∑
σ
∣∣∣xσ(1), xσ(2), . . . , xσ(m)〉. (3)
The summation runs over all possible permutations σ that give different tuples (xσ(1), xσ(2), . . . , xσ(m)).
Equivalently, we have∣∣x; Sym〉 = 1√
m!
∏
j∈X mj !
∑
σ∈Sm
∣∣∣xσ(1), xσ(2), . . . , xσ(m)〉. (4)
The coefficients in the front of the above two equations are normalization constants. The set of
states {∣∣x; Sym〉}
x∈Xm
forms an orthonormal basis of the symmetric subspace ∨mH. This implies that the dimension of the
symmetric subspace is (
N +m− 1
m
)
.
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Let ΠSymm be the projection onto the symmetric subspace ∨mH. For a permutation σ ∈ Sm,
define operator
Wσ =
∑
x1,x2,...,xm∈X
∣∣x
σ
−1
(1)
, x
σ
−1
(2)
, . . . , x
σ
−1
(m)
〉〈
x1, x2, . . . , xm
∣∣.
We have the following useful identity
ΠSymm =
1
m!
∑
σ∈Sm
Wσ. (5)
Let µ be the Haar measure on S(H), we have∫ (|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗m dµ(ψ) = (N +m− 1
m
)−1
ΠSymm .
2.2 Cryptography
In this section, we recall several definitions and results from cryptography that is necessary for this
work.
Pseudorandom functions (PRF) and pseudorandom permutations (PRP) are important construc-
tions in classical cryptography. Intuitively, they are families of functions or permutations that looks
like truly random functions or permutations to polynomial-time machines. In the quantum case, we
need a strong requirement that they still look random even to polynomial-time quantum algorithms.
Definition 1 (Quantum-Secure Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations). Let K, X , Y be the
key space, the domain and range, all implicitly depending on the security parameter κ. A keyed
family of functions
{
PRFk : X → Y
}
k∈K is a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (QPRF) if for
any polynomial-time quantum oracle algorithm A, PRFk with a random k ← K is indistinguishable
from a truly random function f ← YX in the sense that:∣∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[APRFk(1κ) = 1]− Prf←YX [Af (1κ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ).
Similarly, a keyed family of permutations
{
PRPk ∈ SX
}
k∈K is a quantum-secure pseudorandom
permutation (QPRP) if for any quantum algorithm A making at most polynomially many queries,
PRPk with a random k ← K is indistinguishable from a truly random permutation in the sense that:∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[APRPk(1κ) = 1]− PrP←SX [AP (1κ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ).
In addition, both PRFk and PRPk are polynomial-time computable (on a classical computer).
Fact 1. QPRFs and QPRPs exist if quantum-secure one-way functions exist.
Zhandry proved the existence of QPRFs assuming the existence of one-way functions that are
hard to invert even for quantum algorithms [43]. Assuming QPRF, one can construct QPRP using
various shuffling constructions [45, 36]. Since a random permutation and a random function is
indistinguishable by efficient quantum algorithms [42, 44], existence of QPRP is hence equivalent to
existence of QPRF.
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3 Pseudorandom Quantum States
In this section, we will discuss the definition and constructions of pseudorandom quantum states.
3.1 Definition of Pseudorandom States
Intuitively speaking, a family pseudorandom quantum states are a set of random states
{|φk〉}k∈K
that is indistinguishable from Haar random quantum states.
The first idea on defining pseudorandom states can be the following. Without loss of generality,
we consider states in S(H) where H = (C2)⊗n is the Hilbert space for n-qubit systems. We are given
either a state randomly sampled from the set
{|φk〉 ∈ H}k∈K or a state sampled according to the
Haar measure on S(H), and we require that no efficient quantum algorithm will be able to tell the
difference between the two case.
However, this definition does not seem to grasp the quantum nature of the problem. First, the
state family where each |φk〉 is a uniform random bit string will satisfy the definition—in both cases,
the mixed states representing the ensemble are 1/2n. Second, many of the applications that we can
find for PRS’s will not hold for this definition.
Instead, we require that the family of states looks random even if polynomially many copies of
the state are given to the distinguishing algorithm. We argue that this is the more natural way to
define pseudorandom states. One can see that this definition also naturally generalizes the definition
of pseudorandomness in the classical case to the quantum setting. In the classical case, asking
for more copies of a string is always possible and one does not bother making this explicit in the
definition. This of course also rules out the example of classical random bit strings we discussed
before. Moreover, this strong definition, once established, is rather flexible to use when studying the
properties and applications of pseudorandom states.
Definition 2 (Pseudorandom Quantum States (PRS’s)). Let H be a Hilbert space and K the key space.
H and K depend on the security parameter κ. A keyed family of quantum states {|φk〉 ∈ S(H)}k∈K
is pseudorandom, if the following two conditions hold:
1. (Efficient generation). There is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm G that generates
state |φk〉 on input k. That is, for all k ∈ K, G(k) = |φk〉.
2. (Pseudorandomness). Any polynomially many copies of |φk〉 with the same random k ∈ K
is computationally indistinguishable from the same number of copies of a Haar random
state. More precisely, for any efficient quantum algorithm A and any m ∈ poly(κ),∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[A(|φk〉⊗m) = 1]− Pr|ψ〉←µ[A(|ψ〉⊗m) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ),
where µ is the Haar measure on S(H).
3.2 Constructions and Analysis
In this section, we give an efficient construction of pseudorandom states which we call random phase
states. We will prove that this family of states satisfies our definition of PRS’s. There are other
interesting and simpler candidate constructions, but the family of random phase states is the easiest
to analyze.
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Let PRF : K × X → X be a quantum-secure pseudorandom function with key space K, X =
{0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1} and N = 2n. K and N are implicitly functions of the security parameter κ. The
family of pseudorandom states of n qubits is defined
|φk〉 =
1√
N
∑
x∈X
ω
PRFk(x)
N |x〉, (6)
for k ∈ K and ωN = exp(2pii/N).
Theorem 1. For any QPRF PRF : K ×X → X , the family of states {|φk〉}k∈K defined in Eq. (6)
is a PRS.
Proof. First, we prove that the state can be efficiently prepared with a single query to PRFk. As
PRFk is efficient, this proves the efficient generation property.
The state generation algorithm works as follows. First, it prepares a state
1
N
∑
x∈X
|x〉
∑
y∈X
ωyN |y〉.
This can be done by applying H⊗n to the first register initialized in |0〉 and the quantum Fourier
transform to the second register in state |1〉.
Then the algorithm calls PRFk on the first register and subtract the result from the second
register, giving state
1
N
∑
x∈X
|x〉
∑
y∈X
ωyN
∣∣y − PRFk(x)〉.
The state can be rewritten as
1
N
∑
x∈X
ω
PRFk(x)
N |x〉
∑
y∈X
ωyN |y〉.
Therefore, the effect of this step is to transform the first register to the required form and leaving
the second register intact.
Next, we prove the pseudorandomness property of the family. For this purpose, we consider three
hybrids. In the first hybrid H1, the state will be |φk〉⊗m for a uniform random k ∈ K. In the second
hybrid H2, the state is |f 〉⊗m for truly random functions f ∈ XX where
|f 〉 = 1√
N
∑
x∈X
ω
f(x)
N |x〉.
In the third hybrid H3, the state is |ψ〉⊗m for |ψ〉 chosen according to the Haar measure.
By the definition of the quantum-secure pseudorandom functions for PRF, we have for any
polynomial-time quantum algorithm A and any m ∈ poly(κ),∣∣Pr[A(H1) = 1]− Pr[A(H2) = 1]∣∣ = negl(κ).
By Lemma 2, we have for any algorithm A and m ∈ poly(κ),∣∣Pr[A(H2) = 1]− Pr[A(H3) = 1]∣∣ = negl(κ).
This completes the proof by triangle inequality.
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Lemma 2. For function f : X → X , define quantum state
|f 〉 = 1√
N
∑
x∈X
ω
f(x)
N |x〉.
For m ∈ poly(κ), the state ensemble {|f 〉⊗m} is statistically indistinguishable from {|ψ〉⊗m} for
Haar random |ψ〉.
Proof. Let m ∈ poly(κ) be the number of copies of the state. We have
E
f
[(|f 〉〈f |)⊗m] = 1
Nm
∑
x∈Xm,y∈Xm
E
f
ω
f(x1)+···+f(xm)−[f(y1)+···+f(ym)]
N
∣∣x〉〈y∣∣,
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) and y = (y1, y2, . . . , ym). For later convenience, define density matrix
ρm = E
f
[(|f 〉〈f |)⊗m].
We will compute the entries of ρm explicitly.
For x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Xm, let mj be the number of j in x for j ∈ X . Obviously, one has∑
j∈X mj = m. Note that we have omitted the dependence of mj on x for simplicity. Recall the
basis states defined in Eq. (4)∣∣x; Sym〉 = 1√(∏
j∈X mj !
)
m!
∑
σ∈Sm
∣∣∣xσ(1), xσ(2), . . . , xσ(m)〉.
For x,y ∈ Xm, let mj be the number of j in x and m′j be the number of j in y.
We can compute the entries of ρm as
〈
x; Sym
∣∣ρm∣∣y; Sym〉 = m!
Nm
√(∏
j∈X mj !
)(∏
j∈X m
′
j !
) E
f
[
exp
(2pii
N
m∑
l=1
(
f(xl)− f(yl)
))]
.
It is not hard to verify that the entry is nonzero only if x is a permutation of y. These nonzero
entries are on the diagonal of ρm in the basis of
{∣∣x; Sym〉}. These diagonal entries are
〈
x; Sym
∣∣ρm∣∣x; Sym〉 = m!
Nm
∏
j∈X mj !
.
Let ρmµ be the density matrix of a random |ψ〉⊗m for |ψ〉 chosen from the Haar measure µ. It is
well-known that
ρmµ =
(
N +m− 1
m
)−1 ∑
x;Sym
∣∣x; Sym〉〈x; Sym∣∣
We need to prove
D
(
ρm, ρmµ
)
= negl(κ).
Define
δx;Sym =
m!
Nm
∏
j∈X mj !
−
(
N +m− 1
m
)−1
.
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Then
D(ρm, ρmµ ) =
1
2
∑
x;Sym
∣∣δx;Sym∣∣ .
The ratio of the two terms in δx;Sym is
m!
(
N +m− 1
m
)
Nm
∏
j∈X
mj !
=
m−1∏
l=0
(
1 +
l
N
)
∏
j∈X
mj !
.
For sufficient large security parameter κ, the ratio is larger than 1 only if
∏
j∈X mj ! = 1, which
corresponds to x’s whose entries are all distinct. As there are
(
N
m
)
such x’s, we can calculate the
trace distance as
D
(
ρm, ρmµ
)
=
(
N
m
)[
m!
Nm
−
(
N +m− 1
m
)−1]
=
N(N − 1) · · · (N −m+ 1)
Nm
− N(N − 1) · · · (N −m+ 1)
(N +m− 1) · · ·N .
For m ∈ poly(κ), both terms in the last line of the equation is 1 − negl(κ) for sufficiently large
security parameter κ, and this completes the proof.
We remark that a similar family of states was considered in [1] (Theorem 3). However, the size of
the state family there depends on a parameter d which should be larger than the sum of the number
of state copies and the number of queries. In our construction, the key space is fixed for a given
security parameter, which may be advantageous for various applications.
We mention several other candidate constructions of PRS’s and leave detailed analysis of them
to future work. A construction closely related to the random phase states in Eq. (6) uses random ±1
phases,
|φk〉 =
1√
N
∑
x∈X
(−1)PRFk(x)|x〉.
Intuitively, this family is less random than the random phase states in Eq. (6) and the corresponding
density matrix ρm has small off-diagonal entries, making the proof more challenging. The other
family of candidate states on 2n qubits takes the form
|φk〉 =
1√
N
PRPk
[∑
x∈X
|x〉 ⊗ |0n〉
]
.
In this construction, the state is an equal superposition of a random subset of size 2n of {0, 1}2n and
PRP is any pseudorandom permutation over the set {0, 1}2n. We call this the random subset states
construction.
Our PRS constructions can be implemented using shallow quantum circuits of polylogarithmic
depth under appropriate cryptographic assumptions. To see this, note that there exist PRFs that
can be computed in polylogarithmic depth, which are based on lattice problems such as “learning
with errors” (LWE) [33], and are believed to be secure against quantum computers [6]. These
PRFs can be used directly in our PRS construction. (Alternatively, one can use low-depth PRFs
that are constructed from more general assumptions, such as the existence of trapdoor one-way
permutations [28].)
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This shows that PRS states can be prepared in surprisingly small depth, compared to quantum
state t-designs, which generally require at least linear depth (when t is a constant greater than 2), or
polynomial depth (when t grows polynomially with the number of qubits) [4, 10]. (Note, however,
that for t = 2, quantum state 2-designs can be generated in logarithmic depth [13].) Moreover, PRS
states are sufficient for many applications where high-order t-designs are used, provided that one
only requires states to be computationally (not statistically) indistinguishable from Haar-random.
4 Cryptographic Non-cloning Theorem and Quantum Money
A fundamental fact in quantum information theory is that unknown or random quantum states
cannot be cloned [40, 15, 38, 30, 31]. The main topic of this section is to investigate the cloning
problem for pseudorandom states. As we will see, even though pseudorandom states can be efficiently
generated, they do share the non-cloning property of generic quantum states.
Let H be the Hilbert space of dimension N and m < m′ be two integers. The numbers N,m,m′
depend implicitly on a security parameter κ. We will assume that N is exponential in κ and
m ∈ poly(κ) in the following discussion.
We first recall the fact that for Haar random state |ψ〉 ∈ S(H), the success probability of
producing m′ copies of the state given m copies is negligibly small. Let C be a cloning channel that
on input (|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗m tries to output a state that is close to (|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗m
′
for m′ > m. The expected
success probability of C is measured by∫ 〈(|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗m′ , C((|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗m)〉dµ(ψ).
It is known that [38], for all cloning channel C, this success probability is bounded by(
N +m− 1
m
)/(
N +m′ − 1
m′
)
,
which is negl(κ) for our choices of N,m,m′.
We establish a non-cloning theorem for PRS’s which says that no efficient quantum cloning
procedure exists for a general PRS. The theorem is called the cryptographic non-cloning theorem
because of its deep roots in pseudorandomness in cryptography.
Theorem 3 (Cryptographic Non-cloning Theorem). For any PRS {|φk〉}k∈K, m ∈ poly(κ), m < m′
and any polynomial-time quantum algorithm C, the success cloning probability
E
k∈K
〈(|φk〉〈φk |)⊗m′ , C((|φk〉〈φk |)⊗m)〉 = negl(κ).
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there is a polynomial-time quantum cloning algorithm C such
that the success cloning probability of producing m + 1 from m copies is κ−c for some constant
c > 0. We will construct a polynomial-time distinguisher D that violates the definition of PRS’s.
Distinguisher D will draw 2m+ 1 copies of the state, call C on the first m copies, and perform the
SWAP test on the output of C and the remaining m+1 copies. It is easy to see that D outputs 1 with
probability (1 +κ−c)/2 if the input is from PRS, while if the input is Haar random, it outputs 1 with
probability (1 + negl(κ))/2. Since C is polynomial-time, it follows that D is also polynomial-time.
This is a contradiction with the definition of PRS’s and completes the proof.
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4.1 A Strong notion of PRS and equivalence to PRS
In this section, we show that, somewhat surprisingly, PRS in fact implies a seemingly stronger
notion, where indistinguishability needs to hold even if a distinguisher additionally has access to an
oracle that reflects about the given state. There are at least a couple of motivations to consider an
augmented notion. Firstly, unlike a classical string, a quantum state is inherently hidden. Give a
quantum register prepared in some state (i.e., a physical system), we can only choose some observable
to measure which just reveals partial information and will collapse the state in general. Therefore, it
is meaningful to consider offering a distinguishing algorithm more information describing the given
state, and the reflection oracle comes naturally. Secondly, this stronger notion is extremely useful in
our application of quantum money schemes, and could be interesting elsewhere too.
More formally, for any state |φ〉 ∈ H, define an oracle Oφ := 1− 2|φ〉〈φ| that reflects about |φ〉.
Definition 3 (Strongly Pseudorandom Quantum States). Let H be a Hilbert space and K be
the key space. H and K depend on the security parameter κ. A keyed family of quantum states{|φk〉 ∈ S(H)}k∈K is strongly pseudorandom, if the following two conditions hold:
1. (Efficient generation). There is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm G that generates
state |φk〉 on input k. That is, for all k ∈ K, G(k) = |φk〉.
2. (Strong Pseudorandomness). Any polynomially many copies of |φk〉 with the same random
k ∈ K is computationally indistinguishable from the same number of copies of a Haar
random state. More precisely, for any efficient quantum oracle algorithm A and any m ∈
poly(κ), ∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AOφk (|φk〉⊗m) = 1]− Pr|ψ〉←µ[AOψ(|ψ〉⊗m) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ),
where µ is the Haar measure on S(H).
Note that since the distinguisher A is polynomial-time, the number of queries to the reflection
oracle (Oφk or Oψ) is also polynomially bounded.
We prove the advantage that a reflection oracle may give to a distinguisher is limited. In fact,
standard PRS implies strong PRS, and hence they are equivalent.
Theorem 4. A family of states
{|φk〉}k∈K is strongly pseudorandom if and only if it is (standard)
pseudorandom.
Proof. Clearly a strong PRS is also a standard PRS by definition. It suffice to prove that any PRS
is also strongly pseudorandom.
Suppose for contradiction that there is a distinguishing algorithm A that breaks the strongly
pseudorandom condition. Namely, there exists m ∈ poly(κ) and constant c > 0 such that for
sufficiently large κ,∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AOφk (|φk〉⊗m) = 1]− Pr|ψ〉←µ[AOψ(|ψ〉⊗m) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ = ε(κ) ≥ κ−c.
We assume A makes q ∈ poly(κ) queries to the reflection oracle. Then, by Theorem 5, there is
an algorithm B such that for any l∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AOφk (|φk〉⊗m)]− Prk←K[B(|φk〉⊗(m+l))]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2q√l + 1 ,
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and ∣∣∣∣ Pr|ψ〉←µ[AOψ(|ψ〉⊗m)]− Pr|ψ〉←µ[B(|ψ〉⊗(m+l))]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2q√l + 1 .
By triangle inequality, we have∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[B(|φk〉⊗(m+l))]− Pr|ψ〉←µ[B(|ψ〉⊗(m+l))]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ κ−c − 4q√l + 1 .
Choosing l = 64q2κ2c ∈ poly(κ), we have∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[B(|φk〉⊗(m+l))]− Pr|ψ〉←µ[B(|ψ〉⊗(m+l))]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ κ−c/2,
which is a contradiction with the definition of PRS for {|φk〉}. Therefore, we conclude that PRS
and strong PRS are equivalent.
We now show a technical ingredient that allows us to simulate the reflection oracle about a state
by using multiple copies of the given state. This result is inspired by a similar theorem proved by
Ambainis et al. [5, Lemma 42]. We have improved their reduction by replacing a reflection operation
about a particular subspace to the reflection about the standard symmetric subspace, which we
know how to implement efficiently.
Theorem 5. Let |ψ〉 ∈ H be a quantum state. Define oracle Oψ = 1− 2|ψ〉〈ψ| to be the reflection
about |ψ〉. Let |ξ〉 be a state not necessarily independent of |ψ〉. Let AOψ be an oracle algorithm that
makes q queries to Oψ. For any integer l > 0, there is a quantum algorithm B that does not make
any queries to Oψ such that
D
(AOψ(|ξ〉),B(|ψ〉⊗l ⊗ |ξ〉)) ≤ 2q√
l + 1
.
Moreover, the running time of algorithm B is polynomial in that of algorithm A and l.
Proof. Consider a quantum register T, initialized in state |Θ〉T = |ψ〉⊗l. Let Π be the projection
onto the symmetric subspace ∨l+1H and R = 1− 2Π be the reflection about the symmetric subspace.
Assume without loss of generality that algorithm A is unitary and only perform measurements
in the end. We define algorithm B to be same as A except that when A queries Oψ on register D,
B applies the reflection R on the collection of quantum registers D and T where T is initialized in
state |Θ〉. We first analyze the corresponding states after the first oracle call to Oψ in algorithms A
and B,
|ΨA〉 = Oψ|φ〉D ⊗ |Θ〉T, |ΨB〉 = R
(|φ〉D ⊗ |Θ〉T).
For any two state |x〉, |y〉 ∈ H, we have
〈x,Θ|R|y,Θ〉 = 〈x|y〉 − 2 E
pi∈Sl+1
(〈x| ⊗ 〈Θ|)Wpi(|y〉 ⊗ |Θ〉)
= 〈x|y〉 − 2
l + 1
〈x|y〉 − 2l
l + 1
〈x|ψ〉 〈ψ|y〉
=
l − 1
l + 1
〈x|y〉 − 2l
l + 1
〈x|ψ〉 〈ψ|y〉 ,
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where the first step uses the identity in Eq. (5) and the second step follows by observing that the
probability of a random pi ∈ Sl+1 mapping 1 to 1 is 1/(l + 1). These calculations imply that,
〈Θ|R|Θ〉 = l − 1
l + 1
1− 2l
l + 1
|ψ〉〈ψ|.
We can compute the inner product of the two states |ΨA〉 and |ΨB〉 as
〈ΨA|ΨB〉 =
〈|φ,Θ〉〈φ,Θ|, (Oψ ⊗ 1)R〉
=
〈|φ〉〈φ|, Oψ〈Θ|R|Θ〉〉
≥ 1− 2
l + 1
.
This implies that
‖|ΨA〉 − |ΨB〉‖ ≤
2√
l + 1
.
Let |ΨqA〉 and |ΨqB〉 be the final states of algorithm A and B before measurement respectively.
Then by induction on the number of queries, we have∥∥|ΨqA〉 − |ΨqB〉∥∥ ≤ 2q√l + 1 .
This concludes the proof by noticing that
D
(|ΨqA〉, |ΨqB〉) ≤ ∥∥|ΨqA〉 − |ΨqB〉∥∥ .
Finally, we show that if A is polynomial-time, then so is B. Based on the construction of B, it
suffices to show that the reflection R is efficiently implementable for any polynomially large l. Here we
use a result by Barenco et al. [7] which proposes an efficient implementation for the projection Π onto
∨l+1H. More precisely, they design a quantum circuit of size O(poly(l, log dimH)) that implements
a unitary U such that U |φ〉 = ∑j |ξj〉|j〉 on H⊗(l+1) ⊗H′ for an auxiliary space H′ of dimension
O(dim(H⊗l)). Here |ξ0〉 = Π|φ〉 corresponds to the projection of |φ〉 on the symmetric subspace.
With U , we can implement the reflection R as U∗SU where S is the unitary that introduces a minus
sign conditioned on the second register being 0.
S|Ψ〉|j〉 =
{
−|Ψ〉|j〉 if j = 0,
|Ψ〉|j〉 otherwise.
4.2 Quantum Money from PRS
Using Theorem 4, we can improve Theorem 3 to the following version. The proof is omitted as it is
very similar to that for Theorem 3 and uses the complexity-theoretic non-cloning theorem [1, 2] for
Haar random states.
Theorem 6 (Cryptographic Non-cloning Theorem with Oracle). For any PRS {|φk〉}k∈K, m ∈
poly(κ), m < m′ and any polynomial-time quantum query algorithm C, the success cloning probability
E
k∈K
〈(|φk〉〈φk |)⊗m′ , COφk ((|φk〉〈φk |)⊗m)〉 = negl(κ).
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A direct application of this non-cloning theorem is that it gives rise to new constructions for private-
key quantum money. As one of the earliest foundational findings in quantum information [39, 8],
quantum money schemes have received revived interests in the past decade (see e.g. [1, 26, 27, 16,
17, 3]). First, we recall the definition of quantum money scheme adapted from [2].
Definition 4 (Quantum Money Scheme). A private-key quantum money scheme S consists of three
algorithms:
• KeyGen, which takes as input the security parameter 1κ and randomly samples a private key k.
• Bank, which takes as input the private key k and generates a quantum state |$〉 called a
banknote.
• Ver, which takes as input the private key k and an alleged banknote |¢〉, and either accepts or
rejects.
The money scheme S has completeness error ε if Ver (k, |$〉) accepts with probability at least
1− ε for all valid banknote |$〉.
Let Count be the money counter that output the number of valid banknotes when given a collection
of (possibly entangled) alleged banknotes |¢1, ¢2, . . . , ¢r〉. Namely, Count will call Ver on each banknotes
and return the number of times that Ver accepts. The money scheme S has soundness error δ
if for any polynomial-time counterfeiter C that maps q valid banknotes |$1〉, . . . , |$q〉 to r alleged
banknotes |¢1, . . . , ¢r〉 satisfies
Pr
[
Count
(
k,C(|$1〉, . . . , |$q〉)
)
> q
] ≤ δ.
The scheme S is secure if it has completeness error ≤ 1/3 and negligible soundness error.
For any PRS =
{|φk〉}k∈K with key space K, we can define a private-key quantum money schemeSPRS as follows:
• KeyGen(1κ) randomly outputs k ∈ K.
• Bank(k) generates the banknote |$〉 = |φk〉.
• Ver(k, ρ) applies the projective measurement that accepts ρ with probability 〈φk |ρ|φk〉.
We remark that usually the money state |$〉 takes the form |$〉 = |s, ψs〉 where the first register
contains a classical serial number. Our scheme, however, does not require the use of the serial
numbers. This simplification is brought to us by the strong requirement that any polynomial copies
of |φk〉 are indistinguishable from Haar random states.
Theorem 7. The private-key quantum money scheme SPRS is secure for all PRS.
Proof. It suffices to prove the soundness of SPRS is negligible. Assume to the contrary that there is
a counterfeiter C such that
Pr
[
Count
(
k,C(|φk〉⊗q)
)
> q
] ≥ κ−c
for some constant c > 0 and sufficiently large κ. From the counterfeiter C, we will construct an
oracle algorithm AOφk that maps q copies of |φk〉 to q + 1 copies with noticeable probability and
this leads to a contradiction with Theorem 6.
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The oracle algorithm A first runs C and implement the measurement{
M0 = 1− |φk〉〈φk |,M1 = |φk〉〈φk |
}
on each copy of the money state C outputs. This measurement can be implemented by attaching an
auxiliary qubit initialized in (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 and call the reflection oracle Oφ conditioned on the qubit
being at 1 and performs the X measurement on this auxiliary qubit. This gives r-bit of outcome
x ∈ {0, 1}r. If x has Hamming weight at least q + 1, algorithm A outputs any q + 1 registers that
corresponds to outcome 1; otherwise, it outputs |0〉⊗(q+1). By the construction of A, the probability
that it succeeds in cloning q + 1 money states from q copies is at least κ−c.
Our security proof of the quantum money scheme is arguably simpler than that in [2]. In [2], to
prove their hidden subspace money scheme is secure, one needs to develop the so called inner-product
adversary method to show the worst-case query complexity for the hidden subspace states and use
a random self-reducible argument to establish the average-case query complexity. In our case, it
follows almost directly from the cryptographic non-cloning theorem with oracles. The quantum
money schemes derived from PRS’s enjoy many nice features of the hidden subspace scheme. Most
importantly, they are also query-secure [2], meaning that the bank can simply return the money
state back to the user after verification.
It is also interesting to point out that quantum money states are not necessarily pseudorandom
states. The hidden subspace state [2], for example, do not satisfy our definition of PRS as one can
measure polynomially many copies of the state in the computational basis and recover a basis for
the hidden subspace with high probability.
5 Pseudorandom Unitary Operators
Let H be a Hilbert space and let K a key space, both of which depend on a security parameter κ.
Let µ be the Haar measure on the unitary group U(H).
Definition 5. A family of unitary operators {Uk ∈ U(H)}k∈K is pseudorandom, if two conditions
hold:
1. (Efficient computation) There is an efficient quantum algorithm Q, such that for all k and
any |ψ〉 ∈ S(H), Q(k, |ψ〉) = Uk|ψ〉.
2. (Pseudorandomness) Uk with a random key k is computationally indistinguishable from
a Haar random unitary operator. More precisely, for any efficient quantum algorithm A that
makes at most polynomially many queries to the oracle,∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AUk(1κ) = 1]− PrU←µ[AU (1κ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ).
Our techniques for constructing pseudorandom states can be extended to give candidate construc-
tions for pseudorandom unitary operators (PRUs) in the following way. Let H = (C2)⊗n. Assume we
have a pseudorandom function PRF : K×X → X , with domain X = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N −1} and N = 2n.
Using the phase kick-back technique, we can implement the unitary transformation Tk ∈ U(H) that
maps
Tk : |x〉 7→ ωPRFk(x)N |x〉, ωN = exp(2pii/N). (7)
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Our pseudorandom states were given by |φk〉 = TkH⊗n|0〉, where H⊗n denotes the n-qubit Hadamard
transform. We conjecture that by repeating the operation TkH
⊗n a polynomial number of times, we
get a pseudorandom unitary operation. Alternatively, a polynomial number of times of repetition of
the circuit
PRPk(H
⊗n ⊗ 1⊗n),
on 2n qubits may be another candidate construction.
Pseudorandom unitary operators may be useful and provide efficient alternatives for unitary
t-designs in may settings. It also trivially implies the existence of PRS’s by definition and can be
employed whenever a PRS is used.
Lemma 8. For any PRU {Uk}k∈K, {Uk|0〉}k∈K is a PRS.
Proof. If there is a quantum algorithm A that takes m ∈ poly(κ) copies of state Uk|0〉 and
distinguishes it from Haar random states, we can design algorithm A′ that distinguishes {Uk} from
the Haar random U in the following way. A′ prepares m copies of |0〉, calls the unitary oracle on
each copy, sends these states to algorithm A and outputs whatever A outputs.
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